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TEAM PRODUCTION IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout*
For nearly two decades, legal and economics scholars who study business
organizations have tended to view those organizations through the lens of a principalagent model of the firm.1 This model rests on the assumption that the equity holders in a
business (for example, the shareholders in a corporation) are the firm's residual
claimants, entitled to all profits left over after the fim's contractual obligations have been
paid. Thus the equity holders are ina sense the ultimate owners of the firm. Officers,
directors, and employees are viewed as agents whom the equity holders hire to manage
the business on their behalf.
Because the principal-agent approach assumes that the corporation is the
shareholder's "property," it implies that corporate officers' and directors' primary duty is
to generate wealth for shareholders. Yet in a publicly-held corporation with widelydispersed shareownership, it can be difficult for shareholders to monitor managers and
ensure that they run the firm in a fashion that serves the shareholders' interests. The
resulting separation of ownership from control has led many corporate scholars who
adopt the principal-agent approach to assume that the central economic problem to be
faced in a public corporation is the "agency cost" problem of monitoring managers and
motivating them to act as faithful agents. 2 Not surprisingly, the solutions that come out of
principal-agent analysis often involve strengthening shareholders' control rights and
ability to negotiate contractual restraints on manager opportunism. 3
It is difficult to overstate the influence that the principal-agent approach has had on
modem thinking about business organizations. Although the language of agency costs
* Dr. Blair is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Visiting Professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center; Professor Stout is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. This
Symposium finds its origins in a roundtable conference on the topic of Team Production in Business
Organizations that was held at the Georgetown University Law Center in March of 1999 and supported by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. We would like to express our gratitude to the Sloan Foundation for its support, and
to the conference participants for their many helpful comments and insights.
1. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano ed., 1993); see also Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 738, 740-48 (1997) (stating that the
central problem of corporate governance is the agency problem).
2. This focus can be traced back at least to Adolf Berle's and Gardiner Means' classic book, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

3. We associate the principal-agent model with the "contractarian" tradition of describing the corporation
as a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, because leading contractarian scholars have generally adopted the
position that shareholders are the firm's residual claimants. Thus, shareholders are assumed to act as principals
in the set of agency contracts that make up the firm, just as if they were the owners. Contractarian scholars have
accordingly focused on the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers as the most
important "contract" in the nexus that makes up the firm. See, e.g., sources cited supranote 1.
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finds it origins in the economic literature of the 1970s and early 1980s, in the years since
it has become standard in business schools, finance departments, and law schools. Law
professors in particular have come to adopt the principal-agent model as the dominant
4
paradigm for understanding the modem corporate enterprise. Thus, a generation of law
students schooled in principal-agent analysis have gone on to become judges, legislators,
and business leaders who also incorporate this model into their way of thinking.
The principal-agent model offers important insights into corporations and, more
generally, business organizations. In many ways, however, it paints a potentially
misleading portrait of the modem business firm. The problems start with the underlying
assumption that shareholders own the corporation. As a legal matter, shareholders do not
"own" the assets of a corporation. These are owned by the firm itself. Moreover, over the
past few decades an increasingly large portion of the value of U.S. firms has come to be
attributable to assets that may not even be "ownable" in the traditional sense. Intangibles,
including employees' human capital, account for a rapidly growing share of total
such as property, plant, and equipment have
corporate value, while tangible assets
5
importance.
in
steadily diminished
Consider also the principal-agent model's implication that corporate directors' sole
task is to maximize shareholder wealth. Most corporate officers and directors (and a
significant subset of legal scholars) describe the corporate director's job as a much more
complex balancing act in which they must serve not just shareholders' interests, but also6
employees.
those of other "stakeholder" groups such as managers, creditors, and
who
individuals
the
of
Similarly, the principal-agent model assumes that the behavior
reined
self-interest
of
participate in firms is best described by a narrow economic model
in by legal sanctions (for example, the requirements of corporate law and contract law).
This emphasis does not fit well with the perceptions of those who actually participate in
business firms, who regard legal sanctions as remedies of last resort, and who often
describe themselves as pursuing joint objectives beyond their own self-interest.
These and other limitations of the principal-agent approach have led to a growing
sense of unease among many corporate scholars, a sense that the principal-agent model
may not tell the whole story. Although agency problems certainly exist in business firms,
the firm itself may have been organized to solve other kinds of economic and contracting

4. This influence is readily apparent from a quick perusal of almost any corporate law casebook. See,
e.g., WILLIAM CARY & MELVIN EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (7th ed. 1995)
(discussing agency costs); id. at 213-220 (discussing managers' obligation to run the firm for the benefit of the
shareholders); LEWIS SOLOMON ET. AL, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 348 (4th ed. 1998) ("the
shareholders are considered to be a corporation's ultimate owners"); id. at 620 (discussing the agency costs
problem that results from the separation of ownership and control).
5. As recently as 1978, the book value of property, plant, and equipment of publicly-traded corporations
in the United States accounted for 83% of the market value of the financial claims on firms (that is, market
value of outstanding debt and equity). By the end of 1997, the book value of property, plant, and equipment
accounted for less than one-third of the market value of firms' financial claims. See Margaret M. Blair &
Thomas A. Kochan, The New Relationship:Human Capital in the American Corporation (forthcoming 1999,
Brookings) (manuscript on file with authors).
6. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 286 n.82 (1999), reprinted in 24 J. CORP. L. 751, 777-78 n.82 (1999) (discussing this perspective);
Steven M.H. Wallman, Understandingthe Purpose of a Corporation:An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 80910 (1999) (same).
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problems. 7 Identifying and exploring those other problems can provide important new
insights into the nature and function of business organizations and of business law.
One of those alternate economic problems-the problem of team production-is the
subject of this Symposium. Team production problems arise in situations where three
conditions are met. The first condition is that economic production requires a team. In
other words, production requires the combined inputs (of time, money, or other valuable
resources) of two or more individuals. The second condition is that at least some of the
resources the team members must invest to produce are "team-specific," meaning they
have a significantly higher value when used in the team than in their next best use. The
third condition is that the gains resulting from team production-the economic "rents"are joint or nonseparable, making it difficult to attribute any particular portion of the
gains to any single team member's contribution.
Business organizations provide classic examples of team production. Successful
businesses often require inputs from large numbers of individuals, including
shareholders, creditors, managers, and rank-and-file employees. Many of the resources
these "team members" invest are team-specific, in the sense that they have a much higher
value when used in the team than outside the enterprise. Most obviously, managers and
employees invest firm-specific human capital. But financial investors' contribution also
often becomes team-specific, as investors cannot easily recover the full value of their
money after it has been spent on specialized equipment and salaries. Thus, both types of
investors-those who invest human capital, and those who invest financial capital-must
wait until team production begins before they see a return on their investment. And once
those returns begin to come in, there is no obvious way to decide what portion of the
profit is due to each member's investment.
Participants in team production thus often find themselves in the following dilemma.
Each has made an essential contribution of resources. None can recover the full value of
that contribution outside the team. If their venture is successful, how should they divide
the profits among themselves? Particularly when production is ongoing, when inputs are
difficult to monitor, when the future is uncertain-in other words, in the everyday
business environment-explicit contracts that accurately dole out the benefits of
production according to contribution and merit are difficult or impossible to draft.
Suppose team members agree ex ante to a sharing rule (for example, "divide all gains
from team production equally"). Such a rule creates incentives for individual team
members to shirk because each member will enjoy the full benefit of her shirking while
sharing the cost with the rest of the team. On the other hand, if the team decides to wait
and divide up the gains ex post, they may succumb to wasteful "rent-seeking,"
squabbling over which member is entitled to claim a bigger share. Uncontrolled shirking
and rent-seeking can reduce and even destroy the economic gains that flow from team
8
production.
7. As Ronald Coase pointed out, if markets can also efficiently organize production, the fundamental
question is why firms exist in the first place. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 35 (1988) ("[I]n view of the
fact that it is usually argued that coordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization
necessary?").
8. See Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 265-76; reprinted in 24 J. CORP. L. 751, 763-71 (1999) (discussing
the team production problem).
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Participants in business organizations who make team-specific investments
accordingly often find themselves exposed to the opportunistic behavior of other team
members. Sometimes such opportunism can be controlled through contract. Often,
however, contract does not work very well. Team members may need to find
extracontractualmeans of protecting themselves enough to encourage the team-specific
investment necessary for team production.
In the following collection of nine papers, eleven authors examine various aspects of
business law from a team production perspective. In the process, they offer a way of
thinking about the nature and purpose of business organizations that is often startlingly
different from the traditional principal-agent approach.
9
The collection opens with our paper, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw.
In this article we argue that a public corporation is best understood as a nexus of teamspecific assets invested by shareholders, managers, employees, and others who hope to
profit from team production. Property rights over these assets are held by a legal entitythe corporation-that is separate from any of its participants. And control over that entity
rests not with the shareholders, but with a board of directors that serves as a trustee for
the firm as a whole. While the board is nominally elected by the shareholders and in
practice often heavily influenced by management, as a matter of law it remains insulated
from the direct command and control of these or any other corporate constituents. We
argue that this otherwise puzzling arrangement can be explained as a solution to the
problem of team production. In particular, by putting control over the firms' assets and
outputs in the hands of the board (whose members are precluded by law from using that
control for their own personal benefit), corporate law prevents shareholders, managers,
and other team members from using such control to opportunistically expropriate rents
from the team. Thus, team members who feel they deserve a larger share of the gains
from team production must ultimately either appeal to the directors or abandon their
team-specific investment by exiting the firm. The net result, we argue, is that team
members who cannot easily contract with each other over how to divide up the gains
from team production instead agree to give up control over that decision, and over their
team-specific assets, to a "mediating hierarchy" dominated by the board of directors.
Although this second-best solution imposes its own costs (most obviously, the costs
associated with placing ultimate control of the firm in the hands of a board whose
members do not have a significant economic stake in its success), those costs may be
worthwhile when it is otherwise impossible to protect team-specific investment from
other team members' opportunism, and so encourage team production.
Unlike the conventional principal-agent model, the mediating hierarchy model of the
public corporation as a response to team production problems provides theoretical
support for those who argue that corporate law should not require the board of directors
to ruthlessly maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of other stakeholders' interests.
This argument is developed further in the Honorable Steven M.H. Wallman's essay,
Understanding the Purpose of the Corporation.10 In this essay, former Securities and
Exchange Commissioner Wallman lays out the case against "shareholder primacy" as the
appropriate corporate governance norm. He points out that while the idea that directors
9. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, reprintedin 24 J. CORP. L. 751 (1999).
10. Wallman, supra note 6.
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should maximize shareholder wealth has gained currency among academics, it is not and
has never been an accurate depiction of U.S. corporate law. Rather, the law generally
grants directors discretion to consider the interests of other corporate constituencies, in
addition to the interests of the shareholders, in shaping business strategy. He goes on to
suggest that the genius of U.S. corporate law is that it gives directors and officers this
flexibility, thereby improving the economic performance of the corporate team as a
whole, while providing powerful protections to investors through the securities laws.
If directors of public corporations are and should be free to balance shareholders'
interests against those of other stakeholders (as the mediating hierarchy model suggests),
the question naturally arises: how do directors determine what share of the joint output
from team production should be given to each team member? When should corporate
profits be paid out to shareholders in dividends, when should they be used to provide
employees with a more attractive workplace, and when should they be retained to expand
managers' empires? From an efficiency perspective, all that is required to protect team
production is that the board make sure each member of the team receives enough of a
return over opportunity cost that he or she remains willing to stay in the team. Beyond
that minimum, the question of who gets what portion of the corporate surplus may be
determined simply by relative political power. This idea is explored in greater detail in
Professor Viet D. Dinh's essay, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a
Multinational Business Enterprise."I Professor Dinh reviews how the combination of
industrial unions, works councils at the firm-level, and worker representatives on the
supervisory boards of German firms provides one kind of solution to the problem of
protecting firm-specific human capital investments. He then contrasts that solution, which
he identifies as a relatively cooperative one, to the U.S. approach, which he argues relies
more on adversarial bargaining agreements between local unions and individual firms to
provide protection for workers' investments. He explores the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the two approaches in terms of their ability to allow employees to extract a
greater share of the gains from corporate team production, and then goes on to consider
the political problems raised when the two systems meet and mix in the multinational
corporation.
As these discussions of the roles of hierarchy and relative political power suggest,
team production analysis highlights the potential weakness of formal contract as a means
of encouraging investment in team-specific assets. The limits of the "contractarian"
approach to corporate law are explored still further in Professor Melvin Eisenberg's essay
attacking the idea that a corporation should be understood as a "nexus of contracts."
While Professor Eisenberg remains committed to the idea of shareholder primacy, he
argues in The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm' 2 that the conventional notion that a corporation is a nexus of
contracts is wholly inadequate as either a positive or normative guide to understanding
corporate law. By failing to provide any insights into the boundaries of a firm-which
transactions, relationships and contracts are to be understood as within the firm, and
which are outside the firm-the contractarian view basically does away with the idea of

11. 24J. CORP. L.975 (1999).
12. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporationis a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature ofthe Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999).
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firms altogether. It also fails to provide a good account of the roles of hierarchy and
bureaucracy, or an explanation for why there are mandatory rules in corporate law.
Finally, Eisenberg argues that contractarian rhetoric undermines loyalty and trust, which
he believes are essential to efficient organizational performance.
The idea of trust and loyalty as an extracontractual solution to the problem 'of
E. Mitchell's
opportunism in team production is developed further in Professor Lawrence
13
general rule,
a
As
Society.
Post-Capitalist
in
Production
Team
article, Trust and
in
participate
who
individuals
the
of
behavior
the
that
assumes
principal-agent analysis
the
by
channeled
self-interest
rational
of
model
economic
narrow
a
firms conforms to
requirements of contract and corporate law. Professor Mitchell argues that this approach
overlooks important components of human behavior-including behavior driven by trust,
loyalty, and notions of duty-which can be critical to business success. Thus, Mitchell
argues that business institutions need to be understood not just as collections of contracts
linking hyper-rational individuals with each other, but as social institutions within which
people form more or less cooperative relationships that help encourage team production.
Yet another extracontractual solution to the problem of opportunism in team
production is explored in Professor D. Gordon Smith's contribution to the Symposium,
14
Team Production in Venture Capital Investing. Professor Smith's article emphasizes
that the business relationship between an entrepreneur who puts in time, effort, and
expertise, and a venture capital firm that contributes not only financial capital but also
much advice, monitoring, and help in finding additional human and financial capital, is
not so much a principal-agent relationship as a team production relationship in which
both sides invest team-specific resources. Because these inputs are often unobservable,
both sides have to worry about "moral hazard," or opportunism. Smith reviews some of
the complex contracting solutions that have been developed by venture capital firms to
control opportunism and encourage team production. But he also suggests how
reputation-in particular, a venture capital firm's reputation for dealing fairly with
entrepreneurs--can discourage opportunistic behavior that is not prohibited by the terms
of the venture capital contract.
In addition to exploring the role of reputation in protecting team production, Smith's
article also illustrates another important aspect of team production analysis: its broad
applicability to many business situations. Team production can be an important source of
economic gains not just in public corporations, but also in private companies,
partnerships, and (as Smith points out) venture capital deals. Two contributions to the
Symposium-Professor Eric Talley's paper and Professors Edward B. Rock and Michael
L. Wachter's article-apply a team production analysis to close corporations in which
shareholders also are likely to be actively involved in the management of the firm.
In Taking the "I" Out of Team: Intra-FirmMonitoringand the Content of Fiduciary
Duties,1 5 Professor Talley tackles the question of what should be the appropriate standard
of fiduciary duty in different forms of organization, asking in particular about whether
fiduciary standards ought to be stricter or more relaxed for officers in close corporations

13. 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999).
14. 24 J. CORP. L. 949 (1999).
15. Eric Talley, Taking the "I" out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary
Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001 (1999).
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than for those in publicly-held finns. Talley uses a game theoretic approach to argue that
strict fiduciary duties could be counterproductive in close corporations. The reason is that
strict duties, with severe penalties, might create incentives for members of the close
corporation team to expend excessive resources monitoring each other, to the detriment
of productivity. He contrasts this problem of close corporations with the situation in a
publicly-traded company, in which independent directors elected by shareholders who do
not themselves participate in the productive activities of the firm can specialize in
monitoring and devote their time to it without sacrificing productivity.
In Waitingfor the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in
the Close Corporation,16 Professors Rock and Wachter similarly argue that the heart of
the economic problem in close corporations is encouraging investment in what they call
"match specific assets." They also argue that to protect match specific investment in close
corporations, courts need to refrain from applying a broad vision of fiduciary duty in the
close corporation context, with one exception: they should make sure that all
distributions, other than salaries, are strictly pro rata. Thus, Rock and Wachter focus on
how team production can be protected in close corporations where shareholders are active
participants in the business and the mediating hierarchy model of the board of directors
does not apply.
As these articles illustrate, team production problems can be found in both public
and close corporations. However, public and close corporations adopt very different
strategies for dealing with those problems. This observation raises the question of where,
exactly, the boundary between public and private firms lies. This question is addressed
more fully in Professor John C. Coates IV's article, Measuring the Domain of Mediating
Hierarchy:How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?17 Professor Coates focuses
on the variable of director freedom from shareholder and managerial control to argue that
the mediating hierarchy model applies most clearly to publicly-held corporations in
which no single shareholder owns a controlling block of shares, rather than to closelyheld firms or public firms with a controlling shareholder. He then goes on to question
whether directors even in publicly-held firms can be said to be free of various team
members' control. He reviews empirical evidence that suggests that even in public
corporations with widely-dispersed shareownership, managers and/or shareholders are
likely to be able to exert substantial influence on the board of directors. He concludes that
the domain of the mediating hierarchy model (and, by implication, the truly "public"
corporation) may be accordingly limited.
As this brief survey suggests, team production analysis offers a variety of insights
into the modem business firm that are different from the insights offered by the
traditional principal-agent approach. It also raises issues and questions that are different
from the issues and questions raised by the principal-agent model. The articles in this
Symposium provide a useful introduction to some of those insights, issues, and questions.
But they are only a beginning. Team production analysis offers to advance the frontiers
of corporate scholarship, guiding scholars who want to explore important issues, ideas,

16. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and
Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation,24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999).
17. 24J. CoRP. L. 837 (1999).
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and methodologies that have been hitherto neglected. The result should be a fundamental
improvement in our basic understanding of the nature and functions of business firms.
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